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South Asian Regional Cooperation: The India-
Pakistan Imperative 
 
Samad Aftab 
 
A central factor in the lack of South Asian regional cooperation is the 
visceral animosity between India and Pakistan. The India-Pakistan 
security dilemma has prevented the region from exploiting a number of 
opportunities that regional cooperation could offer, including the 
benefits of economic growth, water/energy security and the social 
construction of intraregional goodwill through cultural interaction. 
These benefits could be employed by national governments to pursue 
development goals.  
 
It is incumbent upon India and Pakistan to pave the way for substantive 
regional cooperation by taking measures to encourage cross-border 
economic and social activities. There are a number of challenges in the 
India-Pakistan relationship that hinder regional cooperation. However 
economic integration, if decoupled from political disputes, provides a 
model through which the two states can develop mutually beneficial 
relations.  
 
In particular, three specific areas of cooperation between Pakistan and 
India should be pursued: increased levels of trade and the introduction 
of reforms that facilitate bilateral foreign direct investment; cooperation 
vis-à-vis water and energy resources; and the reduction of travel 
restrictions. These processes would constitute the first steps towards 
wider regional cooperation. 
 
                                                        
*Samad Aftab graduated from the Master of International Relations program at Bond 
University in August 2014. His research interests include national identity formation in 
Pakistan, the relationship between political discourse and foreign policy, and regional 
cooperation in South Asia. 
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Introduction 
 
A central factor in the lack of South Asian regional cooperation is the 
visceral animosity between India and Pakistan. Both states stand to gain 
from the economic and social opportunities of a more open South Asian 
region. For instance, there lies significant potential to establish a valuable 
trade and investment relationship between the two states; in addition, 
mutual gains can be accrued from cooperation in energy and water 
security. These in turn could translate into greater interconnectivity of the 
South Asian region, which through prudent policies could be transformed 
into a significant geo-economic hub at the heart of Asia. However, the 
inability of India and Pakistan to look beyond geopolitical and realist 
concerns – and to extricate their political disputes from effective 
economic and social cooperation – has been to the detriment of the region 
as a whole.  
 
This article argues that it is incumbent upon India and Pakistan to pave 
the way for substantive regional cooperation by taking measures to 
encourage cross-border economic and social activities. The following 
section studies the primary challenges manifest in the India-Pakistan 
relationship that continue to hinder regional cooperation. The core 
problem is that India and Pakistan view each other as their primary 
security threats. In addition, the two states disagree on how regional 
cooperation should function and whether economic cooperation or 
conflict resolution and political reconciliation should come first. This 
article argues for the former: economic integration—not just trade and 
investment relations but also collaboration on energy and water 
security—decoupled from political disputes, provides a model for both 
states to engender mutually beneficial relations.  
 
What is the logic behind regional cooperation in South Asia? At a 
fundamental level, regional cooperation would enhance the capabilities 
of the constituent member states of the region to pursue development 
goals. Much potential exists for mutually beneficial gains from enlarged 
markets and the sharing of common resources. However, India and 
Pakistan need to take the initiative in spurring regional interconnectivity. 
A pertinent example is the fact that the South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA) cannot function effectively if India and Pakistan continue to 
disallow the use of their territories for transit between their neighbouring 
states and the rest of South Asia.  
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The final three sections of this article discuss measures for spurring 
regional interconnectivity. Three specific areas of cooperation between 
India and Pakistan are examined: increased levels of trade and the 
introduction of reforms that facilitate bilateral foreign direct investment 
(FDI); cooperation vis-à-vis water and energy security; and substantive 
reduction of cross-border travel restrictions. These processes would 
constitute the first steps towards wider regional cooperation. 
 
The India-Pakistan security dilemma and its impact on regional 
cooperation 
 
The fractious relationship between India and Pakistan remains at the heart 
of the inability of South Asia to benefit from the opportunities that 
regional cooperation offers.1 Other South Asian leaders have on occasion 
expressed frustration at the detrimental impact of the bilateral enmity 
between India and Pakistan on the functioning of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).2  
 
The most glaring hurdle to sustained cooperation in South Asia is the 
territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. 
For both Pakistan and India, this dispute constitutes the primary cause of 
their enmity since partition in 1947. The result is that the two preeminent 
states in the region not only lack a common threat perception, but also 
view each other as a strategic rival and an existential security threat.3 
 
A pertinent countervailing example is that of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is notable that ASEAN was formed shortly 
after the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia.4 However, during 
the organisation’s early years, ASEAN member states banded together 
against the ‘communist threat’ despite the existence of bilateral disputes.5                                                         
1 R. Dossani, D. C. Sneider & V. Sood (eds.) Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for 
Regional Integration (Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research 
Center, 2010), p. 21. 
2 For example, refer to the statement by former President of the Maldives, Mohamed 
Nasheed, in: S. D. Muni, ‘SAARC at Twenty Five’, ISAS Brief (160), Institute of 
South Asian Studies (2010), p. 2. 
3 S. Rahman, ‘Same but Different?: Comparing the ASEAN and SAARC 
Frameworks’, ISAS Working Paper (123), Institute of South Asian Studies (2011), 
p.14. 
4 The Konfrontasi refers to the conflict between the two states over Indonesia’s 
opposition to Malaysian independence. 
5 Rahman, ‘Same but Different?: Comparing the ASEAN and SAARC Frameworks’ 
(2011), p. 14. 
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The ASEAN example illustrates how relations between regional states 
can be transformed if they converge upon common threat perceptions.   
 
In South Asia, however, due to the lack of a common threat perception, 
India, as the preeminent state in both military and economic terms, will 
need to convince its regional neighbours that it is not out to dominate as 
a regional hegemon. 6  Pakistan tends to view cooperation with India 
through the prism of relative gains, and is reluctant to pursue substantive 
cross-border economic cooperation with its neighbour in the absence of 
a significant political détente.7 For its part, therefore, it will need to 
compromise and transition towards viewing cooperation through the 
prism of absolute gains. In practical terms, this means decoupling 
economic integration from political disputes.  
 
Economic integration or conflict resolution: which comes first? 
 
Is it necessary for Kashmir and other major political disputes to be 
resolved before substantive economic integration can take place? 
Pakistan holds this view and has in the past called for Article 10 of the 
SAARC Charter, which precludes the deliberation of ‘bilateral and 
contentious issues’,8 to be amended.9 India, however, has been resolute 
in its determination to keep Kashmir and other bilateral disputes off the 
SAARC agenda. It argues that SAARC should pursue economic 
cooperation, which could lead to a more positive environment in which 
to discuss complex bilateral disputes.  
 
Consensus between India and Pakistan over what takes precedence is 
more important than the specific approach taken. However, it is unlikely 
in the near future at least that all the SAARC states will agree to transform 
the organisation’s functioning so that it offers a framework for bilateral 
conflicts to be resolved. Thus, economic cooperation is the more likely 
avenue for progress. The recent elections of economically liberal leaders 
in India and Pakistan—Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Sharif—                                                        
6 K. Sridharan, ‘Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: Comparing 
ASEAN and SAARC’, ISAS Working Paper (33), Institute of South Asian Studies 
(2008), pp. 15-16. 
7 E. Sridharan, ‘Improving Indo-Pak relations: international relations theory, nuclear 
deterrence and possibilities for economic cooperation’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 
14, no. 3 (2005), pp. 321-339. 
8 SAARC, SAARC Charter <http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Charter/5/> accessed 
30 June 2014. 
9 Sridharan, ‘Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: Comparing ASEAN 
and SAARC’ (2008), p. 12. 
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have increased the likelihood of substantive economic cooperation 
between the two states, which may spill over into other areas of 
cooperation and set in motion wider economic integration. 
 
Spillover is a central component of the theory of regional integration 
known as neofunctionalism. Haas defines spillover as “the way in which 
the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would 
create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that 
sector.”10 Applied to South Asia, spillover would see states undertaking 
a process of eliminating barriers to trade, permitting intraregional FDI, 
agreeing upon energy and water cooperation, and encouraging 
intraregional cultural interaction. These reforms would enable 
entrepreneurs and businesses to invest across the region, facilitating a 
broader level of economic integration. This would create a larger pool of 
people and businesses with an interest in further liberalising relations 
between the two states, conditioning a level of interdependence where the 
benefits of economic, social and political ties far outweigh the perceived 
risks that may arise from cross-border cooperation.11  
 
Areas of regional cooperation in South Asia 
 
The rationale behind regional cooperation in South Asia lies in the 
opportunities it offers its member states to pursue development goals. 
South Asia is beset with a number of development and human security 
problems. These include abject poverty, high levels of illiteracy, rising 
extremism, vulnerability to natural disasters, poor infrastructure, 
widespread corruption, water scarcity, and concerns over energy security. 
Along with Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia ranks amongst the lowest in 
the world along a vast majority of development indicators. A 2012 World 
Bank brief noted that South Asia is home to over 550 million people who 
live under less than $1.25 a day, which equates to 44% of the population 
defined as poor in the developing world. 12  The same brief espouses 
                                                        
10 E. B. Haas as cited in: B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration 
(Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 60. 
11 A. Hashwani, ‘Non-trade-related stakes of the Pakistan-India relationship’ in M. 
Kugelman & R. Hathaway (eds.) ‘Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? 
What Does It Matter?’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia 
Program and the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan (2013), pp. 116-128. 
12 World Bank, South Asia Regional Brief (2012) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/09/25/south-Asia-Regional-Brief> 
accessed 30 June 2014. 
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regional cooperation as a vital tool in spurring economic growth, which 
could significantly reduce the level of poverty.13  
 
The logic for regional cooperation in South Asia is the economic growth 
and water and energy security that would ensue from the enlargement of 
markets and the management of shared resources.14 All of the South 
Asian states (except for Sri Lanka and the Maldives) share common rivers 
that originate in the Himalayas. But persistent disputes over these rivers 
in addition to governmental mismanagement have led to water scarcity in 
the region. According to a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
water availability per capita in South Asia has decreased by around 70% 
since 1950.15  
 
A related problem is the annual inundation of some South Asian states, 
such as Bangladesh, with floods. Despite being an endemic 
environmental circumstance, the devastation caused by the floods could 
be mitigated through intraregional cooperation in solving disputes over 
shared rivers, collaboration on infrastructure projects and the sharing of 
hydrological data. In the absence of such measures, floods continue to 
devastate parts of the region on a regular basis.16  
 
The states of South Asia also face energy shortages. Over 30% of the 
population in Pakistan and India, and over half the population in 
Bangladesh and Nepal live without access to electricity despite the 
substantial hydropower potential that lies untapped in South Asia’s 
mountain ranges and rivers.17 Thus far South Asia has collectively tapped 
only 16% of this hydropower potential.18 In the coming decades, the 
concomitance of scarce resources in South Asia, a booming population                                                         
13 Ibid. 
14 Dossani, Sneider & Sood, Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional 
Integration (2010). 
15 N. Langton & S. Prasai, ‘Will Conflicts Over Water Scarcity Shape South Asia’s 
Future?’, Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, vol. 2, no.1 (2012), p. 1. 
16 N. S. Khadka, ‘South Asia Disunity Hampers Flood Warnings’, BBC (19 July 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-23358255> accessed 30 June 2014. 
17 N. S. Khadka, ‘South Asia’s Energy Crisis Demands Collective Action’, BBC (12 
August 2012) <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-19107372> accessed 30 June 
2014. 
18 S. Mittra, ‘The South Asian Hydropower Story’, Observer Research Foundation, 
vol. 9, no. 28 (2012) <http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/enm-
analysis/ENM-ANALYSISDetail.html?cmaid=46182&mmacmaid=46183> accessed 
30 June 2014. 
31  
and a lack of regional cooperation will generate further strain in the 
region and provide a source of conflict amongst regional states. It is 
imperative that the collaborative management of water resources and 
partnership in energy provision becomes a priority for the governments 
of the region.  
 
Similarly, economic cooperation through trade and intraregional 
investment is central to the future of regional cooperation in South Asia. 
At present, intraregional trade between SAARC members lies at a paltry 
5.7% of total trade in the region.19 The levels of intraregional trade in 
South Asia as a segment of trade with the rest of the world are shown 
below: 
 
Intraregional trade in South Asia [excluding Afghanistan]20 
 
 Exports % Imports % 
Country/Region Year South 
Asia 
Rest of 
world 
South 
Asia 
Rest of 
world 
Bangladesh 2000 
2007 
1.4 
4.9 
98.6 
95.1 
9.6 
14.7 
90.4 
85.3 
Bhutan 1999 
2008 
99.2 
98.8 
0.8 
1.2 
75.4 
75.1 
24.6 
24.9 
India 1999 
2008 
3.8 
5.4 
96.2 
94.6 
0.8 
0.6 
99.2 
99.4 
Maldives 1999 
2008 
19.6 
11.1 
80.4 
88.9 
20.9 
16.7 
79.1 
83.3 
Nepal 1999 
2003 
39.2 
53.8 
60.8 
46.2 
47.8 
53.6 
52.2 
46.4 
Pakistan 1999 
2008 
3.7 
4.9 
96.3 
95.1 
1.9 
4.4 
98.1 
95.6 
Sri Lanka 1999 
2008 
2.8 
7.1 
97.2 
92.9 
11.7 
22.4 
88.3 
77.6 
South Asia 1999 
2008 
4.0 
5.7 
96.0 
94.3 
3.8 
4.3 
96.2 
95.7 
World 1999 
2008 
1.0 
1.9 
99.0 
98.1 
1.0 
1.5 
99.0 
98.5 
 
                                                         
19 Dossani, Sneider & Sood, Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional 
Integration (2010). 
20 G. Saini, Prospects of Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia (Cambridge, 
UK: Woodhead Publishing Limited, 2012), p. 54. 
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Smaller economies such as Bhutan and Nepal show high levels of 
intraregional trade. However, this can be explained by the fact that both 
are landlocked countries and heavily dependent on India as their primary 
trading partner. The larger economies of South Asia, in particular India 
and Pakistan, carry out minimal intraregional trade relative to their total 
trade. SAARC’s value of trade as a percentage of total Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), at a miniscule 1.6%, also lags far behind other regional 
blocs.21  
 
The economic growth that would result from increased intraregional 
trade, investment and labour flows would boost the ability of the states to 
pursue development goals. Intraregional FDI can contribute to GDP 
growth in South Asia and birth positive externalities such as technology 
and skills, roads and other infrastructure. It can also provide a stimulus to 
economic growth in the form of industry and jobs creation at various 
levels of the supply chain.  
 
South Asia will play a defining role in the coming decades. The rise of 
India as an economic powerhouse will be central to realising the ‘Asian 
Century’. However, the perennial instability of this region not only 
hampers vital development goals for hundreds of millions mired in 
poverty, but it also has severe implications for the region’s ability as a 
whole to contribute to the global economy. State-led regional cooperation 
provides a viable model to counteract these problems in the long run 
without contravening national interest. 
 
It is incumbent upon India and Pakistan to create an amicable atmosphere 
and the requisite political climate for this to occur. The remaining 
sections will focus on specific measures that these two states can 
undertake to achieve this goal. 
 
India-Pakistan: trade and foreign direct investment 
 
Trade 
 
Pakistan and India need to open their markets to each other before South 
Asian intraregional trade can take off. Both states stand to gain from the 
enlarged markets and subsequent economic growth. Pakistan requires a 
growth rate of over 7% for successive decades if it is to achieve a material 
                                                        
21 Ibid., p. 57. 
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improvement in its Gross National Income. 22  India is presently 
witnessing a relative economic slowdown after two decades of 
remarkable growth.23 From the current level of US$2.5 billion in annual 
bilateral trade, some predictions suggest that liberalising reforms would 
generate a minimum annual trade value of US$10 billion within the first 
few years.24 Other projections put the value of ‘potential trade’ between 
India and Pakistan at US$19.8 billion.25 Another study estimates that 
annual trade of $US50 billion could be achieved if trade was completely 
liberalised. 26  For these significantly higher volumes of trade to be 
achieved, the governments of India and Pakistan must proceed with a 
period of stringent reforms and initiatives.  
 
An important step would be taking the initiative in implementing the 
principles of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which was 
agreed upon in 2006. This agreement laid out obligations to reduce 
intraregional tariffs to a maximum of 5% by 2015 for India, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka, and by 2018 for the remaining states. However, there has been 
minimal progress in achieving these targets. Many of the South Asian 
states still maintain barriers to trade in the form of sensitive lists, negative 
lists and positive lists. These lists outline the goods that can or cannot be 
traded between states, and also cover goods that may be traded, but are 
not provided tariff concessions. Over half of Indian goods that can be 
potentially exported to Pakistan are banned under Pakistan’s negative list, 
and over a third of Pakistani goods that can be exported to India fall under 
India’s sensitive items list.27 India also seemingly indicates a preference 
for trade outside of SAARC, as its present sensitive list for trade with 
South Asian nations is three times larger than a list it presented to 
ASEAN for a potential trade agreement.28 
                                                         
22 H. Shaikh, ‘Pak-India Trade: A Regional Perspective’, Policy Brief, Jinnah Institute 
(2013), p. 2. 
23 ‘The Great Deceleration’, The Economist (27 July 2013) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582256-emerging-market-slowdown-not-
beginning-bust-it-turning-point> accessed 30 June 2014. 
24 Shaikh, ‘Pak-India Trade: A Regional Perspective’ (2013), p. 4. 
25 N. Taneja, ‘Enhancing India-Pakistan trade’, New America Foundation (2013), p. 1. 
26 M. Khan, ‘India-Pakistan Trade Relations - A New Beginning’, New America 
Foundation (2013), p. 2. 
27 Taneja, ‘Enhancing India-Pakistan Trade’ (2013), p. 7. 
28 P. Athukorala, ‘Intra-regional FDI and Economic Integration in South Asia: Trends, 
patterns and prospects’, Background Paper No. RVC 7, Arndt-Corden Department of 
Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, 
Australian National University (2013), p. 10. 
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Significant progress could be made from Pakistan granting India Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) status. Pakistan has often proclaimed its 
readiness to do so in the past, but has never followed through due to 
domestic pressure over the issue.29 Overcoming these internal hurdles 
and granting India MFN status would be a positive development for 
economic relations between these two states. 
 
However, MFN status will have minimal impact if not backed up by the 
requisite structural reforms to facilitate cross-border trade and financial 
connectivity.30 Thus, the creation of additional trade routes along the 
India-Pakistan border is necessary. Prior to the 1965 war, 11 trade routes 
existed between the two states.31 At present the only major land-route for 
trade is the Wagah-Attari border, which divides Pakistani and Indian 
Punjab. Opening up a land-route at the Munabao-Khokhrapar border, 
which divides the southern Pakistani province of Sindh with the Indian 
state of Rajasthan, would dramatically increase cross-border trade and 
could be the first step towards the creation of more trade routes along the 
border.32  
 
In addition, Pakistan and India must open up land routes that connect all 
the South Asian countries in order to permit wider regional trade. This 
would not only provide both states valuable transit fees but would also 
contribute to thawing bilateral relations, spurring regional economic 
interdependence and promoting regional stability. 33  For a landlocked 
nation such as Afghanistan, an agreement such as SAFTA is essentially 
pointless if it is not provided access through Pakistan to the other South 
Asian states. Similarly, India does not allow Pakistan access to 
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal via its territory.  
                                                         
29 Pratyush, ‘Growing India-Pakistan trade bodes well for South Asia’, The Diplomat 
(15 April 2013) <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/growing-india-pakistan-trade-bodes-
well-for-south-asia/> accessed 30 June 2014. 
30 P. De, S. Raihan & E. Ghani, ‘What does MFN Trade Mean for India and Pakistan?: 
Can MFN be a Panacea?’, Policy Research Working Paper 6483, The World Bank, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, Economic Policy and Debt 
Unit (2013), p. 10. 
31 M. Z. Khan, ‘MFN Status for India on the Cards’, Dawn (26 January 2014) 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1082756/mfn-status-for-india-on-the-cards> accessed 
30 June 2014. 
32 Khan, ‘India-Pakistan Trade Relations - A New Beginning’ (2013), p. 11. 
33 R. Harshe, ‘India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir: Peace through Development 
Cooperation’ in V. Kukreka & M. Singh (eds.) Democracy, Development and 
Discontent in South Asia (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2008), pp. 309-328. 
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The limited trade infrastructure, and its poor quality, is also a major 
hurdle to trade between India and Pakistan. The efficiency of trade that 
does occur between the two is handicapped.34 This can be improved by 
permitting private investment into infrastructure building on both sides 
of the border. A public-private setup would expedite the logistics of trade 
between the two states.35 The regulated privatisation of a specific area 
pertinent to cross-border trade, such as the building of vital infrastructure, 
would result in improved levels of trade and investment. Subsequently, 
this would require a greater need for infrastructure and the improvement 
of procedure and logistics, and, in turn, the levels of trade and investment 
would increase again. 
 
Foreign direct investment 
 
Both India and Pakistan also stand to gain from permitting cross-border 
FDI. Indian investors have expressed interest in investing in Pakistani 
mining, petroleum, energy, power and infrastructure projects.36 In 2012, 
India announced that it would permit both outward and inward FDI with 
Pakistan.37 This has yet to coalesce into a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) between the two countries. For that to happen, Pakistan would have 
to grant India MFN status first. India’s announcement regarding Pakistani 
FDI was made around the time that Pakistan proffered its intention to 
grant India MFN status by the end of 2012. Granting MFN status to India 
would boost the chances of securing a BIT in the near future. 
 
The enlarged market that would result from a cross-border BIT would 
provide Indian and Pakistani firms economies of scale, which would be a 
major incentive for cross-border trade and investment. Bilateral FDI 
between India and Pakistan has large potential in areas such as 
information technology (IT), business process outsourcing (BPO), 
entertainment and financial and health services. Furthermore, Indian                                                         
34 S. Haq, ‘Indo-Pak trade: Without Investment in Infrastructure, Bilateral Trade Will 
Fall’, The Express Tribune (30 June 2013) <http://tribune.com.pk/story/570267/indo-
pak-trade-without-investment-in-infrastructure-bilateral-trade-will-fall/> accessed 30 
June 2014. 
35 Ibid. 
36 K. Kochhar & E. Ghani, ‘What can India and Pakistan do to Maximize the Benefits 
from Trade?’ in M. Kugelman & R. Hathaway (eds.) ‘Pakistan-India Trade: What 
Needs To Be Done? What Does It Matter?’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars Asia Program and the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan (2013), pp. 97-115. 
37 ‘India permits FDI from Pakistan’, The Indian Express (1 August 2012) 
<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-permits-fdi-from-pakistan/982460/> 
accessed 30 June 2014. 
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entrepreneurs would find Pakistan a valuable location to invest due to its 
proximity to Central Asia from land, and the Middle East and Persian 
Gulf via the Arabian Sea.38 For Pakistan, India’s highly skilled workers 
and technological expertise would improve the quality of products and 
competitiveness of its own firms. Sustained FDI will also generate 
benefits in the form of externalities such as improved infrastructure, 
access to technology and research, training and education, improved 
business and project management standards, and a wide range of cheaper 
access to products needed for the agricultural and manufacturing 
industries. Finally, FDI will result in a beneficial multiplier effect across 
the supply chains of both states. 
 
India-Pakistan: energy and water cooperation 
 
In a region that is plagued by energy and water insecurity, it is incumbent 
on the larger powers to pave the way for cooperation that will entail 
benefits for all stakeholders. If Pakistan and India do not find a way to 
share common scarce resources, and collaborate on projects that increase 
the availability of energy and water to both economies, the future stability 
of the region has bleak prospects, with concerns of water security being 
the primary cause of a major conflict in South Asia in the future.39 India 
and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 under the auspices 
of the World Bank. However, they have had a number of disputes over 
water resources since then. In addition, as all of the major rivers that flow 
into Pakistan either originate from or flow through the Indian state of 
Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan lives with the constant fear that India can 
cut off its water supply during a conflict.  
 
Instead of continuing down a zero-sum path that has been detrimental to 
both sides, the two states could embark upon water sharing schemes such 
as Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) of the Indus River 
Basin.40 The success of such a resource-sharing venture would benefit                                                         
38 I. Nabi, ‘Pakistan’s Trade with India: Thinking Strategically’ in M. Kugelman & R. 
Hathaway (eds.) ‘Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? What Does It 
Matter?’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program and the 
Fellowship Fund for Pakistan (2013), pp. 31-52. 
39 Langton & Prasai, ‘Will Conflicts Over Water Scarcity Shape South Asia’s Future?’ 
(2012), p. 2. 
40 Global Water Partnership defines IWRM as: ‘a process which promotes the 
coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in 
order to maximize economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.’ <http://www.gwp.org/en/Press-
Room/A-Water-Secure-World/> accessed 30 June 2014. See also: S. Hameed, 
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both India and Pakistan by mitigating the damage caused by floods in 
addition to meeting their water needs. It would also provide a precedent 
for wider regional cooperation in other major basins such as the Ganges 
and Brahmaputra river systems. 
 
Energy security is a related area that India and Pakistan can collaborate 
on. India and Pakistan are in a highly strategic location at the heart of 
Asia, with Central Asia to their north, Iran and the Middle East to their 
West, and East Asia and Southeast Asia to their east. This location 
provides the opportunity to become a regional hub for trade in both 
commodities and energy resources. A project such as the proposed TAPI 
Pipeline, connecting Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, if 
successfully implemented, can provide relief to the energy needs of all 
parties as well as monetary incentives for the nations providing transit, 
which in this case would include Pakistan and Afghanistan. A World 
Bank report published in 2013 notes that Pakistan and India—members 
of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) respectively—“can jointly build a stronger connectivity 
and trade partnership among Southeast, South and Southwest Asia.”41 
 
Limited progress on the TAPI pipeline under the auspices of the Asian 
Development Bank seems to be underway.42 The SAARC Energy Centre 
(SEC), based in Islamabad, should play an important role in these projects 
by facilitating negotiations between the parties. It must ensure that the 
TAPI project is not shelved by advocating its importance to both India 
and Pakistan. The SEC should also encourage Pakistan to consider 
importing electricity from India, which is willing to supply Pakistan,43 to 
help reduce its devastating shortfall. Finally, an IWRM approach in water 
sharing at the Indus River Basin could incorporate joint ventures on 
small-scale hydropower projects that would also help make up the gap in 
energy supply.                                                          
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basin: Application of Integrated Water Resources Management’, Master's Thesis, 
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41 De, Raihan & Ghani, ‘What does MFN Trade Mean for India and Pakistan?: Can 
MFN be a Panacea?’ (2013), p. 21. 
42 Asian Development Bank, 44463-013: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Phase 3 (2014) <http://www.adb.org/projects/44463-
013/main> accessed 30 June 2014. 
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India-Pakistan: cross-border tourism 
 
If Pakistan and India were to ease travel restrictions across the border for 
their civilians, two important benefits would accrue. First, from an 
economic perspective, there is significant scope for the tourism industry 
to profit.44  Second, it would facilitate greater cross-border exchange. 
People-to-people contact is a vital component in transforming the 
multifarious misconceptions that the general populaces in both countries 
have of their neighbour. A visa-on-arrival scheme45 would not only boost 
commercial prospects for businesses, but would also present 
opportunities for cultural interaction. At present, SAARC runs a ‘Visa 
Exemption Scheme’ that permits people defined under certain categories 
to travel freely in the region.46 This should be extended to the general 
populace and encouraged in particular by the Pakistani and Indian 
governments. Over time this may help generate the rudimentary norms 
and values of a regional community. 
 
In 2012, Pakistan and India agreed upon an improved visa regime.47 
However, the two states have delayed in fully implementing the 
agreement, in line with the historical pattern of purported agreements in 
various sectors that are not implemented beyond a minimal level. 48 
Furthermore, without adequate government encouragement and support 
of cross-border tourism, there is very limited potential for travel between 
the two countries. Though the present security situation in Pakistan 
restricts the potential for inward tourism into Pakistan, the Pakistani 
government must still engage with its Indian counterpart in the promotion 
of cross-border initiatives such as arts and sports festivals. India offers 
huge potential as a tourism hub for Pakistanis to visit and foster people-                                                        
44 Pak-India Business Council, Conference: Indo-Pak Bilateral Trade Potential 
<http://www.pakindiabusinesscouncil.com/conference-indo-pak-bilateral-trade-
potential.html> accessed 30 June 2014. 
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46 SAARC, SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme <http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Visa-
Exemption-Scheme/100/> accessed 30 June 2014. 
47 ‘Pakistan, India ease visa regime’, Dawn (8 September 2012) 
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to-people relations. Together, the Pakistani state of Punjab and its Indian 
counterpart constitute approximately 100 million speakers of the Punjabi 
language. Finally, India is also home to approximately 160 million 
Muslims, nearly the whole population of Pakistan.49  
 
In recent years, there has been a rising awareness of the importance of 
cross-border cooperation amongst the civil societies in India and 
Pakistan. Initiatives like Aman ki Asha have been at the centre of an 
increasing segment of the populace in both states who desire peace 
between the two nations.50 This has resulted in the proliferation of cross-
border musical and literary festivals, and conferences discussing the steps 
that must be taken towards peace. There have also been an increasing 
number of institutes and think-tanks in South Asia which continue to 
encourage economic, political and social partnerships in the region. In 
early July 2013, the Jinnah Institute, a think-tank based in Islamabad, 
Pakistan, hosted a conference with the New Delhi based Centre for 
Dialogue and Reconciliation.51 The discussions explored and promoted 
the pursuit of peace between India and Pakistan. A similar Track II 
initiative titled the ‘Chaophraya Dialogue’ is regularly organised between 
the Australia India Institute (Melbourne) and the Jinnah Institute.52 
 
However, the Pakistani and Indian governments must take up the mantle 
in encouraging cross-border tourism and developing an amicable 
atmosphere between the two peoples. The Track II initiatives mentioned 
above are instances of civil society interaction that pave the way for 
formalised cooperation at the governmental level. If the relationship 
between the populace of India and Pakistan could evolve into one of 
mutual respect and empathy, it would be a remarkable boon for broader 
regional cooperation and stability. 
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Conclusion 
 
The bitter relationship between India and Pakistan holds hostage hopes 
for regional cooperation in South Asia. Thus, it is incumbent upon these 
two states to take the initiative in improving their cross-border 
connectivity and subsequently paving the way for substantive regional 
cooperation. Regional cooperation provides a model to pursue 
development goals and raise the welfare of impoverished populations in 
South Asia. The importance of a more unified, integrated and 
interdependent South Asia is crucial to the future prospects of the region. 
 
The economic growth that would ensue from high levels of intraregional 
trade and FDI is necessary for individual governments in the region to 
tackle the high levels of poverty in their countries. Cooperation in energy 
and water resource management would help prop up energy and water 
security. In addition, cross-border travel between India and Pakistan is 
vital in building people-to-people relations, a central component of a 
regional community. Taken together, these processes would constitute 
the first steps towards the development of entrenched regional 
cooperation.  
 
India and Pakistan must recognise their joint responsibility. They must 
acknowledge that their inability to cooperate has a debilitating impact on 
the wider region. If the two states can make real progress in their relations 
in the coming years, their own populations and also those of South Asia 
as a whole will benefit. Isolationism is not an option for neighbours; bold 
steps are required.  
